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1 Introduction
Economics as a social science rests inevitably on the normative preferences and political stand-
points of the involved scientists and, consequently, research institutions like university departments
and institutes. The factual or perceived political point of view of social scientists in general and
economists in particular is of relevance for a couple of reasons: First, it may influence the research
process itself. Economists might be more or less open to new ideas depending on who has proposed
them. For example, in an experimental setting, Javdani and Chang (2019) show, that economists’
agreement to a statement depends on whether they suppose it stems from a “mainstream” economist
or not. Also, Kirchgässner (2011) argues that the interpretation of econometric results strongly
depends on a priori beliefs represented by the field the research stems from: economists believe in
a deterrence effect of capital punishment, whereas researchers from other fields do not. Second,
economists still see themselves to a notable extend as part of theoretical or political schools of
thought. In a survey among German forecasters, Döpke et al. (2019) find that a large fraction of
the respondents subscribes to a school of thought that is often linked to particular political views,
such as the ‘Keynesian’, ‘monetarist’, and similar ways of thinking. Recently, van Dalen (2019)
surveyed Dutch economists and found that their personal values have an impact on their economic
and methodological choices. Third, the ideology of an institution possibly influences how consumers
or firms form their expectations. For example, based on a survey among consumers, Bachmann
et al. (2019) show that their inflation expectations differ between states, according to changes in
the White House occupant and depending on whether Republicans or Democrats dominate the
state. More recently, it has become clear that this is not only the case for economic news: In the
U.S., according to Cookson et al. (2020), Democrats have been much more concerned about the
coronavirus than Republicans, and, therefore, more bullish on stocks. Hence, if the public sees
a particular institute at least partially as representing a certain political group or camp (Geiger
et al., 2009), the expectations of economic agents will respond differently to the forecast or the
policy advice of the institution.
Given the possible importance of the ideology of economists the question arises, as to how
this concept can be measured to make it possible to test some of the hypotheses mentioned above
empirically. To this end, this paper uses computer-based text analysis methods that have recently
been successfully applied to related problems in other fields like political science. In particular, we
use Wordfish, and Wordshoal approaches.
In this study, we refer to institutions that forecast the development of German business cycles.
The focus on these institutions is motivated by the crucial role they play in forming macroeconomic
expectations and beliefs. For example, Roth and Wohlfart (2019) show in an experimental setting,
that individuals respond to changes in professional forecasts by adjusting their own macroeconomic
outlook. Carroll (2003) provides a model and time-series evidence that households derive their
expectations from the ones taken by professional forecasters transmitted by the media. The concept
of narrative economics (Shiller, 2017) suggests the possibility that, for example, the Great Recession
has been the result of popular narratives on which professional forecasters as prominent fortune-
tellers (Friedman, 2013) of our times have a great influence.
Insofar as professional forecasters are important for building expectations and, therefore, for
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macroeconomic outcomes, another possibility emerges: “The politics of expectations: Forecasts
as politics” (Beckert, 2013, p. 237). In a broader perspective, Hirschman and Berman (2014)
emphasize, among other aspects, the role of institutions in explaining the influence of economist
on politics, which relates to out focus on the forecasting institutes. Furthermore, they note that
reporting, for example, the Gross Domestic Product on a regular basis draws the societies’ attention
to certain facets of the world: ”no equivalent device brings income inequality, for example, to the
forefront of our minds each quarter” (Hirschman and Berman, 2014, p. 800). Therefore, the
specifically economic style of reasoning helps to explain the alleged large influence of economics
on the choice of policies. Saint-Paul (2013) provides reasoning on how forecasters with a given
political agenda (i.e. being more ‘pro state/market’ or ‘contra state/market’) may use models
to influence macroeconomic outcomes according to their preferences. Also, from a sociological
perspective, Reichmann (2018) analyses the distribution and communication of economic forecasts
and its influence on, among other things, governments decisions and developments in a market
economy. Saint-Paul (2018) elaborates on the trade-offs that forecasters with political preferences
face: on the one hand, they intend to achieve properties of the model that matches their position.
For example, a more left-leaning researcher may try to model the economy in a way that implies a
large fiscal multiplier or a flat Phillips curve. On the other hand, the model still has to match the
data. This leads to certain conditions a model has to match to be coherent.
We apply the selected methods to a sub-corpus of business cycle forecast reports published
regularly by 5 German economic research institutes plus the ones by a working group of so-called
‘leading’ research institutes in a joint effort (‘Joint Diagnosis’, Gemeinschaftsdiagnose). We apply
the methods on those parts of the reports where the institutions analyse monetary and fiscal policy
issues including advisory text passages and sections. We define a debate as all reports published in
a calendar year by the research institutes and the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose consortium. All business
cycle departments have a very similar structure and all institutes discuss both policy fields in a
macroeconomic context (texts are parts of business cycle reports). Our identification framework,
therefore, assumes that there is only one latent dimension by institution which we loosely frame
as “ideology”. Given this identification strategy, we analyse how certain debate-specific positions
– a linear combination of debate- and institution-specific effects – evolve over time and how this is
related to the general policy environment and other factors.
From a methodological perspective, this paper aims at evaluating if the Wordfish/ Wordshoal
model provides information on the ideological bias of institutions related to economic policy advice.
Information about the ideological bias of economic policy texts, in turn, can provide valuable
information on the influence of ideology on policy prescriptions (Jelveh et al., 2018). In this regard,
the paper adds to the general research on the positions of economists regarding economic policy.
Based on reports from 1999 to 2017 provided by five institutions, we find that on average
over the entire sample, text mining results meet the conventional wisdom insofar as the Berlin
institute (DIW) and the Kiel institute (IfW) are the institutions ideological farthest from each
other. Looking at the results in more detail, we find a large variation during time: the ideological
sound of an institution changes, as the circumstances change. Furthermore, the development of the
debate-specific positions differs considerably between texts related to monetary and fiscal policy,
respectively. Both results suggest that research relying on the assumption of an “once-and-forever”
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ideological tonality of an institution might be over-simplistic. We find an increased polarization of
the debates over monetary policy, but not over fiscal policy, where the debates have always been
quite polarized.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2, presents a review of the mea-
surement of ideology in economics and neighbouring fields and the role text-mining methods play
in this context. Section 3 describes the data used in the study and the criteria used for the text
selection. Section 4 gives an overview of the methods used, followed by the findings in section 5.
Section 6 presents the conclusion.
2 What is “ideology” and how can it be measured empirically?
2.1 Ideology: a pragmatic perspective on a disputed concept
Based on our own experience, we can say that many economists have difficulties with the claim
that in their role as scientists they have political preferences or an “ideology”. This is also sup-
ported by academic work. For example, (Fourcade, 2018, p. 5) reports, based on a survey, that
academic economists ”were anxious to be perceived as apolitical”. This comes as a surprise be-
cause economists regularly – for example in the field of political economy – assume that individuals,
politicians, or institutions differ in their opinions on policy issues and try to influence respective
outcomes accordingly. Naturally, the same should hold for economists as well.
As a rule, economists use the term “ideology” in a rather pragmatic manner, sometimes they
do not even bother to explain or define it. The meaning of the phrase is assumed to be self-
explanatory or different across papers in economics. Saint-Paul (2018), for example, suggests that
“ideological biases” correspond to different values left-wing and more conservative economists give
to central macroeconomic parameters such as fiscal multipliers and the slope of short- and long-
run Phillips curves. Ngo et al. (2018) also give no formal explanation or definition of the term
but use affiliations to political parties or interest groups as an appropriate indicator of ideological
differences. Kirchgässner (2011, p. 471) defines the concept laconically ‘ideology or, in other words,
the personal convictions of the researchers’. This contrasts with the tradition in other disciplines,
say sociology, political sciences, and humanities, in which authors sometimes make large efforts to
precisely define the concept of ideology (Slembeck, 2000). It is also noteworthy that for parts of
the economics community the term has a decisive negative connotation. Mayer (2001) notes that
the term “ideological” is often used as the antithesis to “objective and scientific”. We opt for a
rather pragmatic view of ideology, as in (Mayer, 2001, p. 5) , stating simply that in developing
models and interpreting results extra-scientific value judgements play a role.
2.2 Attempts to measure ideology in economics
In economics, the analysis of ideological positions on research programmes and policy recommenda-
tions has received some attention in recent years. Beyer and Pühringer (2019), for example, analyse
signatories of economists to petitions and open letters and conduct a social network analysis. They
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find close ties along partisan (‘conservative’, ‘liberal’) lines. In the sub-field of political economy,
the literature also provides some approaches in this direction. Some authors try to uncover the
political orientation of persons in committees making decisions on monetary policy. For example,
Berger and Woitek (1997) argue, that the voting behaviour of members of the German central bank
council did not follow partisan lines, as Vaubel (1997) has found.Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) use
biographical information about central bankers to reach conclusions about their political stance on
monetary policy. Potrafke (2013) extends the research from decision-making bodies to institutions
of policy advice and studies the German Council of Economic Experts by analysing the minority
positions articulated in its reports. Another strand of the literature uses survey results involving a
group of prominent economists to analyse the reasons for consensus and dissent among economists
(Gordon and Dahl, 2013) or to investigate latent ideological positions of these persons (Van Gunten
et al., 2016). Randazzo and Haidt (2015, p. 49) also argue that ”We believe that economists, as
human beings, also possess such narratives, and we expect that, on average (not in all cases), these
moral narratives shape economists’ substantive conclusions—positive and normative.”.
2.3 Perspectives from political science and text mining
The analysis of ideology has a long tradition in political science and sociology. Recent develop-
ments make it possible to analyse this problem more rigorously. On the one hand, the ‘text as data’
(Gentzkow et al., 2019) revolution provides novel (possibly ‘Big’) data-sets to test related hypothe-
ses. On the other hand, methodological advances in the field of text mining offer additional ways to
statistically analyse these data. For example, the evolution of computational text analysis methods
in political science offers new possibilities for the large-scale text analysis of ideological viewpoints
in economic policy. The method used in this paper can detect and operationalize the stance of ide-
ology in the context of political speeches (Proksch and Slapin, 2010), legislative debates (Lowe and
Benoit, 2013) and election manifestos (Lo et al., 2014; Seher and Pappi, 2011; Slapin and Proksch,
2008; Louwerse, 2011) – texts in which ideology is expected to play an important role. It remains
to be investigated if the computer-based text analysis methods work for texts in which ideology is
less prominent or even discouraged, such as academic texts from economic research. ‘Importantly,
detecting ideology in domains where institutions and norms are in place to maintain neutrality is
different from predicting ideology in domains where it is overt, such as media or political speech
[. . . ].’ (Jelveh et al., 2018, p. 5)
In a recent study, authors attempt to identify the underlying political viewpoints of eco-
nomic policy texts drawing on the usage of specific ideologically charged words such as ‘austerity’
(Gründler and Potrafke, 2019). Wehrheim (2019) uses topic models to identify the distribution
of themes analysed in the annual reports of the German Council of Economic Experts. Javdani
and Chang (2019) apply an experimental design that tests for ideologically- and authority-biased
updating. Their results point to a noteworthy bias with a significant heterogeneity by different
aspects such as gender, country, and area of research. In a similar vein, Jelveh et al. (2018) use
topic modelling to predict economists’ partisanship from academic papers. They show that the
partisanship of economists, imputed from data on their political activities, is correlated with the
estimated parameters of the topic model. Bowles and Carlin (2020) apply the topic modelling ap-
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proach to economic textbooks to identify their dominant themes. Lüdering and Winker (2016) use
text-mining techniques to elaborate on the interaction of topics in an economics-related academic
journal and real-world economic development.
This paper adds to the research on economists’ ideology by applying a method of unsupervised
quantitative text analysis (Poisson regression combined with a latent factor model). Grimmer and
Stewart (2013) provide an overview of different methods of computational text analysis, discussing
the advantages and pitfalls of the different methods. The authors propose a classification scheme
that distinguishes between classification methods and ideological scaling methods, subdividing both
strands into unsupervised and supervised methods. Classification methods assign texts to a set of
categories. If these categories are known, they can be used in the process, providing additional infor-
mation. The use of classification schemes is increasingly common in economic research (Gentzkow
et al., 2019). Classification approaches such as dictionary methods and topic models find applica-
tions in the analysis of central bank communication (Born et al., 2014; Lucca and Trebbi, 2011;
Nardelli et al., 2017), economic policy uncertainty (Müller et al., 2018), and other topics (Fritsche
and Puckelwald, 2018; Jelveh et al., 2018; Bowles and Carlin, 2020).
In contrast to classification methods, the application of ideological scaling methods is rare in
economic research. While classification methods assign texts to a set of categories, ideological
scaling methods try to locate the texts in a policy space by retrieving a latent variable that is
interpreted as the underlying political position or ideology of the respective text. This implies that
ideology dominates the language of the text, which is an important assumption of these methods
(Grimmer and Stewart, 2013; Lowe and Benoit, 2013). The most prominent approaches in this
sub-field are Wordscores, Wordfish, and Wordshoal.
Wordscores is an automated scaling method put forward by Laver et al. (2003) and has been
mainly used in political science so far. It is a supervised method, meaning that the positions of
the texts are estimated based on selected reference (training) texts. Wordfish, in contrast, makes
use of an unsupervised algorithm. This means that the method identifies words that indicate a
location on a political spectrum using a parametrically estimated latent variables approach based
on a Poisson distribution instead of relying on reference texts. Slapin and Proksch (2008) developed
the Wordfish model in the context of political science debates. The authors estimated latent policy
positions of German political parties from party manifestos from 1990 to 2005 and cross-validated
the results with hand-coding, expert surveys, and results from Wordscores. A further investigation
of the method using Monte-Carlo simulation confirms the robustness of the algorithm and provides
guidelines for the use of the Wordfish model with respect to German texts (Proksch and Slapin,
2009). Lowe and Benoit (2013) applied the method to legislative debates in Ireland, validating
the output from the Wordfish model with the results from a hand-coded method. They find a
high correspondence of the results with two exceptions that might point to additional dimensions,
picked up either by the coders or the Wordfish model. Louwerse (2011) uses the Wordfish model to
investigate the congruence between the party manifestos and parliamentary speeches. The authors
categorize the paragraphs of the manifestos and the parliamentary speeches into different issues,
such as Foreign Affairs and Economy.
Lauderdale and Herzog (2016) extend the Wordfish model by explicitly considering that one or
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more further dimension(s) might interfere with the ideological positioning. Specifically, it addresses
two key limitations of the traditional Wordfish approach, namely that word discrimination param-
eters are assumed to be the same over debates or time and that topic variation is not considered.
Goet (2019) and Wratil and Hobolt (2019) have used the Wordshoal model to analyse political
debates in the UK or Europe but to the best of our knowledge has never been used in political
economy contexts and economics.
3 The Dataset
In this section, we describe the data at hand. In particular, we give an overview on the German
economic research institutes we consider in this study, explain the criteria on which we base the
selection, and explain, how we extract the texts for the analysis in the paper.
3.1 The German forecasting institutions
For Germany, a broad range of institutions provides research-based economic policy advice. We
focus on institutions, that are based in Germany and provide forecasts for the German economy1.
Since we are interested in a possible influence of political positions of research institutions, we
restrict our investigation to institutions that are not themselves part of the political decision-
making (e.g. the Bundesbank or the Federal ministries which are responsible for the Annual
Economic Report of the German Federal Government) and that offer forecasts and policy advice
as a public good. Also, we are interested in macroeconomic policy and consider institutions with
a focus on specific regions or branches. All these criteria lead us naturally to those economic
research institutes in Germany that have taken part in the ‘joint diagnosis’. While the institutes
forming this group have changed quite a bit over the last couple of years, some major institutes
have participated in at least 28 forecasts of the ‘joint diagnosis’ over the last 20 years (compare
Figure A1 in the appendix), namely2:
• The German Institute of Economic Research (DIW), Berlin and its texts on the prospects of
the German economy published in its regular publication series ‘DIW Wochenbericht ’
• The Institute for World Economics (IfW), Kiel. In this case, we have collected the texts
published in the institute’s journal ‘Die Weltwirtschaft ’ for the larger part of the sample and
on internet publications for more recent texts.
• The ifo institute, Munich, which publishes most of its forecast related texts in the journal
“ifo Schnelldienst”.
• The RWI - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Essen, which publishes most of its
business cycle diagnoses in the journal ‘RWI Konjunkturberichte’.
1Therefore, we do not consider, for example, the European Central Bank, which does not provide public forecasts
specifically for the German economy
2Other studies on the political position of German economic research institutes refer to a similar selection (see,
e.g., Gründler and Potrafke, 2019)
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• The IWH - Halle Institute for Economic Research, Halle, which publishes most of its forecasts
in the journal ‘Wirtschaft im Wandel ’.
Furthermore, we considered the bi-annual publications on the state and prospective macroeco-
nomic development of the German economy by the ‘joint diagnosis’ itself for the corpora.
We make use of data from 1999 to 2017. The beginning of the sample is motivated by the intro-
duction of the joint European currency since one of our objectives is to analyse the political view
on monetary policy. The introduction of a joint currency also had implications for the institutional
framework of fiscal policy. It, therefore, seems justified in our view to analyse both policy fields
only from 1999 onwards.
3.2 Criteria for text selection
Referring to Slapin and Proksch (2014), Bunea and Ibenskas (2015) point out four central assump-
tions that need considering in the context of quantitative content analysis: 1. ‘the dimensionality
of the political/policy space’, 2. ‘the informative nature of texts’, 3. ‘the data/text generating
process behind analysed documents’ and 4. ‘the comparability of texts’, taking into account the
language, the audience addressed and the data generating process (Bunea and Ibenskas, 2015, p.
432). Since the selected reports are written for the same audience and generated in a similar work
process, we consider assumptions 2 to 4 to be fulfilled. Concerning the dimensionality of the policy
space, we tried to define clearly delineated subjects to retrieve text sections that deal with only
one economic policy field.
Apart from the dimensionality of the policy space, it was important to identify a policy field
that is covered over a long period and by all six institutions. We, therefore, chose monetary policy
and fiscal policy as two separate fields of economic policy forming a substantial part of the economic
policy debate. They are part of nearly every economic report while other topics like labour market
policy and wage policy are subject to greater fluctuations, depending on the current economic
policy debate.
As regards the structure of the reports, institutions, like the DIW, IWH, RWI, and the ‘joint
Diagnosis’ follow the same consistent structure over long periods. Their reports contain three
chapters: the first describes the world economy and the German economy, the second presents the
forecast results for the economic development, and the last chapter focuses on the economic policy
conclusions, often entitled ‘economic policy considerations’. The reports of the ifo and the IfW,
on the other hand, do not follow a given structure. Rather, their reports rely on a more thematic
approach. With their generally assumed supply-side identities (Ngo et al., 2018), both the IfW
and the ifo represent an important economic policy position within the German economic policy
framework. They furthermore make a substantial part of the ‘joint diagnosis’, being involved in 40
and 34 reports over 20 years, respectively (compare figure A1 in Appendix). Hence, we decided to
keep them in our sample even though this might cause some inconsistency within the data.
Concerning the first category of reports, we chose all sections that deal explicitly with monetary
or fiscal policy within the chapter on economic policy considerations. Since not all relevant data
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were included in these chapters, we additionally started a word search for specific monetary or
fiscal policy related words3 and checked whether the sections in question deal dominantly with
either monetary or fiscal policy. Information boxes and text passages, entitled ‘Excursus’, which
deal with specific or technical aspects, were not included in the corpora.
Finally, this leads us to two corpora with 292 texts for monetary policy and 307 texts for fiscal
policy.
4 Methods: Wordfish and Wordshoal
To measure ideological positions we make use of Wordshoal, a parametric scaling model based on
Poisson regressions (Wordfish, see Slapin and Proksch (2008)) combined with a Bayesian factor
decomposition (Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016).
To better grasp the idea of Wordshoal as a hierarchical factor model with three dimensions
(word, institution/speaker, and debate) one might beforehand refer to its two-dimensional prede-
cessor model Wordfish (Slapin and Proksch, 2008). The goal of the unsupervised scaling method
Wordfish is to measure a single latent factor in the policy space which is typically assumed to
measure ideology (Slapin and Proksch, 2014; Bunea and Ibenskas, 2015). To do so, Wordfish infers
policy positions from word frequencies to compute a scaling coefficient based on similarity/ distance
in feature use after controlling for word- and debate-specific fixed effects. By construction, Wordfish
assumes a two-dimensional dataset with the dimensions word (k) and document/speaker (d). The
frequency with which document d contains the word k is drawn from a Poisson distribution:4
wik = Poisson(µdk) (1)
log(µdk) = νd + λk + κkθd (2)
where µdk indicates the frequency of the word k used in document d and several latent pa-
rameters, namely νd as a document-specific fixed effect (sometimes referred to as ‘loquaciousness’
of the respective speaker/document), λk as a word-specific fixed effect, θd as the latent position
of the statement of document d in the policy space and κk as the relationship of word k to the
latent document position. The key idea of the model can be described as follows: controlling for
document length and word frequency, words with negative κk will tend to be used more often in
documents with negative θd (and vice versa). Hence, κk can be seen as a discrimination parameter
of word k for ideological positions expressed in the document (Benoit, 2018, p.37).
After setting an identifying constraint5 the Wordfish model estimates results in a one-
3For monetary policy we searched for the words and word stems ‘GELDPOL’, ‘ZINS’, ‘EZB’, for fiscal policy we
searched for ‘FINANZPOL’, ‘FISKAL’, ‘AUSGABEN’, ‘STEUERN’, and ‘SCHULDEN’
4The word ’poisson’ also means “fish” in French. Wordfish could, therefore, and with some nerdy humour be
interpreted as Word-Poisson. This explains the “fishy” language used for labelling some of methods. The model is
arguably appropriate for word frequency analysis as Poisson-distributed variables are bounded between (0, inf) and
only take discrete values 0, 1, 2, . . .. Due to the exponential transformation word counts are modelled as a function
of log document length and word frequency (Benoit, 2018, p. 38)
5Benoit (2018) discusses several assumptions to identify the position on a left–right scale. We apply an inequality
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dimensional scale θd in the document dimension d as a proxy of the ideological position expressed in
the respective document (Goet, 2019). The estimation procedure proposed by Slapin and Proksch
(2008) is based on a conditional maximum likelihood algorithm. Other possible approaches include
Monte-Carlo-Markov-Chain (MCMC) procedures and methods based on variational inference using
an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm (Imao et al., 2016).
The Wordshoal model is an extension of the Wordfish approach. It assumes that one or more
further dimension(s) might interfere with the ideological positioning. Specifically, it addresses two
key limitations of the Wordfish approach, namely that word discrimination parameters are assumed
to be the same over debates or time and that topic variation is not considered.
In the implemented version of Wordshoal, we assume three dimensions (Lauderdale and Herzog,
2016, p. 1) – a word dimension, ab debate-specific dimension, and a latent institution-specific
dimension. Put it differently, the dimension ‘document’ of the established Wordfish model is now
decomposed into two dimensions – debate-specific effects and a vector of the latent institution-
specific positions. The space where the vector of latent positions is located is interpreted as an
‘ideology’ space by Lauderdale and Herzog (2016).
To apply the approach, we first had to decide on the debate classification. For corpora in political
science a debate dimension might be easily operationalized (parliament debates, legislative debates,
etc.). In our application we opted for a yearly aggregation, i.e. summing up all statements in a
calendar year as a “pseudo-debate”. Second, we have to assume an identifying assumption as in
the Wordfish model. Again we assume to have the latent position of DIW to be left of the position
of IfW in early 1999 (first observation of documents for both institutions in our corpora).
The Wordshoal model is then implemented as a hierarchical factor model and estimated in a
two-step procedure.6 In the first stage, a Wordfish model is estimated to scale word-use variation
in each debate separately. Specifically, at this stage of the model, the frequency that speaker/
institution i will use word k in debate j is given by:
wijk = Poisson(µijk) (3)
log(µijk) = νij + λjk + κjkψij (4)
where νij stands for individual/institution i’s word usage in debate j, λjk, κjk for word-debate-
usage parameters and ψij for the speaker/institution i’s debate-specific position. The estimation
is based on the MCMC approach (Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016, p. 6).
In the second stage, a Bayesian factor analysis is applied to decompose the document-specific
positions ψij into institution- and debate-specific latent factors.
7 Specifically, the second-stage
constraint for two θ̂s to specify a left–right direction for the first observable statements of the DIW and IfW in 1999 (see
Döpke (2000) for arguments underpinning this view). The assumption is stated in such a way that θ̂DIW (1999:M01) <
θ̂IfW (1999:M03), i.e. DIW’s position in January 1999 is left of the IfW’s position ion March 1999 in relative terms.
6Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016, p. 6 argue that a fully hierarchical model estimated in one step would impose
more computational difficulties without significant gains in estimation efficiency.
7The second-stage factor analysis is performed using the R package rjags (Plummer, 2019) as implemented in the
R package quanteda (Benoit et al., 2018).
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model is given by:
ψij ∼ N (αj + βjθi, τi) (5)
θi ∼ N (0, 1) (6)
αj , βj ∼ N (0, 0.25) (7)
τi ∼ G(1, 1) (8)
Lauderdale and Herzog (2016, p. 5) argue, that “ψ can be more or less strongly associated
with the aggregate latent dimension θ being estimated across all debates, with either positive or
negative polarity for any particular debate. Essentially, this allows the model to select out those
debate-specific dimensions that reflect a common dimension (large estimated values of βj), while
down-weighting the contribution of debates where the word usage variation across individuals seems
to be idiosyncratic (βj ≈ 0).” Parameter βj is, therefore, referred to by Lauderdale and Herzog
(2016) as a measure of “polarity”.8














Speaker Institute ψij · βj Position of institution i on debate j
(calibrated to the general scale)














Strength of association of debate-scales with
general scale across debates/years (root mean
square, weighted by number of speeches nj in
each debate j)







Association of word with general scale across
debates (mean, weighted by frequency of word
appearance nkj in each debate)
Baseline position ./. Debate αi Baseline ideological position of debate j
(Benoit, 2018, p. 49)
Polarization ./. Debate |βi| Correlation of debate i with common
dimension j as a measure of “polarization”
(Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016; Benoit, 2018)
Source: Modified Table 1 from Lauderdale and Herzog (2016, p. 5) and Benoit (2018, p. 49).
Lauderdale and Herzog (2016, p. 5) suggest combining first and second stage parameters to
compute quantities of interests. Table 1 compares the main variables of interest in Lauderdale and
Herzog (2016) and in the present paper. Specifically, we make use of θj which in our view measures
the ideological position as a latent debate-invariant common dimension for all institutions, |βi| as
8According to Lauderdale and Herzog (2016, p. 5), “priors for θi and βj allow the model to remain agnostic about
the relative polarity of individual debate dimensions, while constraining the common latent dimension of interest to
a standard normal scale.”
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a measure for the ‘polarization’ of debates and αi as the ‘baseline ideological stance’ of debate i.
Furthermore, we use the ‘debate-specific position’ ψij ×βj which can be interpreted as the position
of institution i on debate j calibrated to the general scale. We also calculate a debate loading
as a measure of association of debate-scales with the general scale, as well as some measures of
word loadings to measure the strength of association for certain words or groups of words with the
general scale across sets of debates.
5 Results
5.1 Wordfish results: The impact of the financial crisis
As a starting point, the Wordfish model was estimated over both – monetary and fiscal policy –
corpora separately but without considering possible debate-specific changes in language features
(assuming λk and κk to be invariant to debates). The results for the document position θd are
plotted in Figure 1 sorted by years and in descending order within each year.
The results are interesting, because – given the restrictive assumption of a unique debate –
we observe a common shift of all institution positions (θd in the Wordfish specification) during
the financial crisis 2008 and the years following it. This is pronounced for the text sections on
monetary policy indicating that a shift in the topics and narratives of the debates happened quite
fast. Interestingly, the measure seems to drift back to its pre-crisis levels at the end of the sample,
possibly reflecting more critical comments on the course of ECB’s monetary policy.
For fiscal policy text sections, a shift in the measured positions is also observable but occurs in
a smoother manner over time. Also, the values drift from a positive to a negative θ estimate, i.e.
in the opposite direction vis-à-vis the development in monetary policy debates.
5.2 Discourse over time: a descriptive perspective
In our view, the Wordfish results indicate a problem with a shift in the focus of debates for both
policy fields. To visualize some aspects of the changing focus of debates or narratives, we used
some standard descriptive text mining tools.
As a first exercise, for both monetary and fiscal policy texts, we have split the corpora after
December 2007 in pre- and post-2008 corpora and in all cases, we calculated log-likelihood tests over
all tokens in the vocabularies.9 Figure 2 displays the main results. Words on the right-hand side of
the figure indicate significant over-representation for the post-2008 period, words on the left-hand
side indicate over-representation for the pre-2008 period. The size of the words is governed by the
χ2 statistic of the log-likelihood test for equally distributed terms across corpora, The larger the
word is printed, the higher the respective χ2 statistic. The distance from the zero point on the
x-axis measures the degree of over-/under-representation. The larger the distance of a displayed
word to the zero point, the higher is the degree of over-/under-representation.
9We applied the R packages corpustools (Welbers and van Atteveldt, 2020) and udpipe (Wijffels, 2019) to use a































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For the monetary policy corpus we observe that in the pre-2008 period, discussions were focused
on other debates than in the post-2008 period. The corpora are different in the usage of terms as
e.g. ‘Geldmenge’ (money supply), ‘Referenzwert’ (reference value), and ‘Preisniveaustabilität’ (sta-
bility of price level) which are significantly overrepresented in the pre-2008 sub-corpus. Terms like
‘Krisenländer’ (crisis countries), ‘Finanzkrise’ (financial crisis), and ‘Banken’ (banks) are relatively
overrepresented in the post-2008 sub-corpus.
For the fiscal policy corpus, tax reforms played a role in the debates preceding those in 2008.
We find ‘Steuerreform’ (tax reform), ‘Unternehmensbesteuerung’ (corporate taxes), and ‘Kapi-
talgesellschaften’ (corporations) among the overrepresented terms. For the post-2008 corpus, we
find terms like ‘expansiv’ (expansionary), ‘kräftig’ (strong), or ‘zulegen’ (increase), which indicate
debates related to stabilization policies (possibly after the downturn associated with the financial
crisis). Furthermore, we find terms like ‘Finanzierungssaldo’ (budget deficit), ‘Schuldenbremse’
(debt brake), and ‘Kommunen’ (municipalities) as being overrepresented, indicating ongoing dis-
cussions on consolidation strategies and the fiscal stance at the municipality level.
Overall, the descriptive analysis points to a general scepticism concerning the assumption of a
stable debate over all the years under investigation10. Probably an important dimension is missing
and therefore we turned for further analysis to the Wordshoal model.
5.3 Wordshoal results
5.3.1 The latent ideological position of the institutes on fiscal and monetary policy
Figure 3 depicts the θ̂i values for the institutions at hand based on the whole sample and estimated
by the second-stage factor model in Wordshoal.
Looking at the results for texts onmonetary policy first, it appears that they match conventional
wisdom (see, for example, Ngo et al., 2018, and the literature cited therein): the DIW and the IfW
are the wingers on monetary policy. Interestingly, all other institutions, except the IfW institute,
have quite similar θ̂ values even, if the relatively large standard errors of estimation are considered.
The estimates come as no surprise, since both institutes representing the largest and highest values,
respectively, have been associated with a Monetarist (Kiel) or a Keynesian (Berlin) perspective
regarding the role of monetary policy11. Nevertheless, the results are of some importance, since
they underlines that textual analysis leads to reasonable results with very modest assumptions on
the identification strategy.
Turning to the ideological position estimated out of texts on fiscal policy we also find a pattern
that is by and large in line with the perception of the institutes’ position in public opinion. Still,
one noteworthy difference from the results for monetary policy stands out, as the IfW is in this
context joined in its relative position by the RWI an even by the joint diagnosis. By contrast, as it
10These results are also confirmed by a semantic network analysis – not presented in this paper, but available upon
request from the authors – suggesting that the ties between certain keywords of economic analysis have changed
markedly after the event.
11For an attribution of a theoretical viewpoint of the institutes, see Ngo et al. (2018) and the literature cited
therein.
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b) Fiscal policy
Source: Authors’ own calculation. θ̂i results with +/- 1.96 s.e. confidence bounds.
concerns monetary policy the IfW appears to be an outsider as compared to the other institutes.
If we take the two policy areas together, notable differences become apparent: while the IWH
is close to the DIW in terms of monetary policy, it is closer to the IfW as regards fiscal policy.
While the RWI sides with the DIW on monetary policy, it has a θ̂ more similar to the IfW in case
of fiscal policy. Hence, a single ideological position over all policy areas of an institution might be
an over-simplification. These results are in line with Ngo et al. (2018), who differentiate between
demand-orientated and other minority reports in the ‘Joint diagnosis’. Also, they find some period
dummies significant in their specifications, pointing to changes of the ideological positions over
time.
5.3.2 Debate-specific positions over time
The text-mining techniques allow going beyond the conventional wisdom by showing that the
position of institution i on debate j (calibrated to the general scale after controlling for the debate-
invariant latent ideological stance and polarity) moves considerably. Figure 4 shows the debate-
specific positions for the institutions under investigation.
In other words, in some debates, most of the institutions sound more like the average left of
the right-wingers of the monetary policy debate: sometimes, economists affiliated with the IfW use
a phase usually more associated with Keynesian leaning texts, while the economists employed in
Berlin use a slightly more monetarist wording.
Looking first at the results for texts on monetary policy, results seem plausible from the per-
spective of common sense. In 2016/17, the difference between the IfW and the RWI is quite stark,
reflecting in part, that these institutes are relatively outspoken on monetary policy12.
Turning to the change of debate-specific positions over time for each institution separately,
at least two institutions have undergone noteworthy changes. The debate-specific position of the
12Ngo et al. (2018, p. 44) report that just after the DIW those institutes have the largest share in minority reports
on monetary policy in the joint diagnosis.
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Source: Authors own calculation based on Table 1
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IfW shifted considerably towards a higher positive value. This process begins roughly with texts
produced around 2013 or 2014.
Another change – albeit shorter and less pronounced – is also visible for the Munich (ifo)
institute, where the values of the debate-specific position shift towards negative values at the end
of the sample. The changes in debate-specific positions call into question the assumption of a
static once-and-forever ideological wording of an institute under any circumstances. Rather, the
ideological position, which is assumed to be time-invariant, interacts with the baseline orientation
and polarity of the current debate. Let us consider a parliamentary debate as an example: while
one can safely assume that the orientation of the political parties remains relatively stable, a certain
speaker representing this party might sound different in a discussion over other topics, say, social
policy or national defence.
Figure 4 suggests that the debate-specific positions on fiscal policy do not become more diverse
over time as in the case of monetary policy. Furthermore, visual inspection reveals that phases
in which a certain institute is consistently found to be left or right in terms of positions are less
frequent as in the case of monetary policy. Perhaps the only exception is the DIW during the
period from 2012 to 2017.
5.3.3 Baseline ideological position and polarization of debates over time
To get a deeper understanding of the interaction between debates and latent positions, we analyse
several quantities of interest. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the baseline ideological position αi
throughout the debates.












2000 2005 2010 2015 2017
b) Fiscal policy
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
For the monetary policy corpus, we observe positive but small values before 2008. In the years
after 2008, the baseline position strongly moved to the positive side (according to our identification
a more conservative/ monetarist position). It came down to pre-crisis values at the end of the
sample in 2017.
For the fiscal policy corpus, we observe fluctuations around zero values before and after the
17
financial crisis until 2014/2015. Thereafter, a shift of the baseline position towards negative values
is remarkable (according to our identification of a more Keynesian/ activist position) which would
be in line with the argument for an emerging consensus on a more activist role of the government
among German economists in the last couple of years. For example, Fricke (2015) surveyed the
members of the German Economic Association (‘Verein für Socialpolitik’) and finds what he calls
an ‘American shift’ within the profession: ‘What has clearly increased among German economists
is the proportion of those who say that government debts can better be reduced at times when
the economy is doing reasonably well, as Krugman and others have vehemently pointed out. In
the meantime nearly 70% of the German economists agree with this position; in 2010 the rate was
just over 60%’. Fricke (2015, unpag.). However, this view on the development of the debate in
Germany is not undisputed, Brunnermeier et al. (2018, p. 149 ff.), among others, argue that the
thinking became more in line with the German tradition of economic reasoning in early 2010. In a
similar vein, Farrell and Quiggin (2017, p. 277) argue that ’The Keynesian revival was relatively
short-lived.’
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b) Fiscal policy
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Turning to polarization, Figure 6 shows the absolute values of the β̂ coefficients, which Laud-
erdale and Herzog (2016) interpret as the polarity of a debate. The illustration reveals diverging
trends as regards monetary and fiscal policy discussions: While the institutes’ statements about
fiscal policy have – with few exceptions – always been quite polarized, the ones about monetary
policy show a tendency of larger values towards the end of our sample. A stronger disagreement on
this issue is plausible. For example, based on topic modelling, Müller et al. (2018, p. 576) identify
phases in the German discourse on monetary policy that fit nicely into the changes in polarity.
For example, they identify a so-called ‘uncertainty topic: central bank”, which increased sharply
during the ‘new economy bubble’ and the ‘Euro weakness’ before climbing to unprecedented values
during a ‘wave of crisis’, namely the financial crisis and the subsequent euro crisis.
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5.3.4 Debate and Word Loadings
We also analysed, how sets of debates load on the latent ideological position and how groups of
words load on specific debates.
First, Table 2 shows the mean of the debate loadings, i.e. the strength of association of debate-
scales with general scale across years/debates (see Table 1) for different periods. In other words,
the numbers show, how strongly a set of debates is associated with the overall ideological scale.
For both policy areas and relying on the full sample, we find that roughly 40% of the variation
in the debate-scales can be attributed to the latent ideological divergence across the institutes. A
closer look at Table 2 reveals, however, that debates on monetary policy before the financial crisis
were substantially less driven by the general ideological differences between the institutes than
afterwards. A change of a similar magnitude cannot be observed for fiscal policy, where the debate
loadings are similar for both periods, implying that the debates over fiscal policy have always been
relatively polarized.





Monetary policy 0.37 0.20 0.46
Fiscal policy 0.41 0.36 0.44
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Unlike simple word count or text sentiment approaches, Wordshoal does not need a certain
word a priori to be attributed to an ideological position. Rather, we estimate the full model and
are able to calculate the word loadings, i.e. the association of a word to the general (ideological)
scale.13 Figure 7 shows how some combinations of words load on the scale of latent ideological
positions in our sample over different debates.
For the monetary policy corpus, we observe terms like ‘stützung’ (support), ‘stabilisierung’
(stabilization), ‘liquidität’ (liquidity), ‘aufkäufe’ (purchases) to load more to the negative side of
the ideological scale (literally left from zero), while terms like ‘geld’ (money), ‘zins’ (interest) and
‘potential’ (potential) load to the positive (literally right side from zero) side of the scale. For the
fiscal policy corpus we observe loadings to the negative side of the scale for terms like ‘nachfrage’
(demand) and ‘ausgabe’ (expenditure), whereas terms like ‘reform’ (reform) and ‘konsolidierung’
(consolidation) load more to the other side of the scale. The strength of the word loading how-
ever varies much from debate to debate – which supports the arguments for choosing Wordshoal
approach over Wordfish as the main method.
5.4 Some remarks on robustness checks
The approaches outlined and used above call for robustness checks. We do not to present in full
here, but to make them available upon request.
13Such a word can easily be one, that is normally not interpreted as an ideology-biased one. For example, Lauderdale
and Herzog (2016) find that ‘prexist’ and related words became ‘left-wing’ during the debates over Obama-care in
the U.S. senate, while ‘tax’ and related words represented the conservative position.
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b) Fiscal policy
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on Table 1. For monetary policy the word loading calculation is based on the
words containing ‘stützung’ (support), ‘stabilisierung’ (stabilisation), ‘liquidität’ (liquidity), ‘aufkäufe’ (purchases)
(results in turquoise) and ‘geld’ (money), ‘zins’ (interest), ‘potential’ (potential) (results in red). For the fiscal policy
corpus, the calculation is based on the words containing ‘reform’ (reform), ‘konsolidierung’ (consolidation) (results
in turquoise) and ‘nachfrage’ (demand), ‘ausgabe’ (expenditure) (results in red).
First, forecasting reports refer to the year to be forecast rather than to the calendar year, which
might more plausibly constitute a debate. We checked, whether defining a debate along these lines
changes our results qualitatively. Our main findings, in particular the estimated latent ideological
position of the institutions, are quite unaffected. Nevertheless, the debate-specific positions may
change considerably.
Second, the identifying restriction in the Wordshoal model is admittedly somewhat arbitrary.
Hence, we re-estimated the model using the ideological position of the IfW and the DIW at the
end the sample as restriction. We find no noteworthy differences in the results.
Third, we estimated Wordshoal for two sub-periods covering the period before and after the
financial crisis. Although we stress a methodological caveat (the two sub-sections provide too few
data to estimate the coefficients precisely), the results are quite robust.
6 Conclusion
To locate the ideological standpoint of six important institutions in the field of economic policy
advice and business cycle forecasting, we analysed the wording of texts selected from business
cycle reports for the years 1999- 2017. These texts refer either to fiscal or monetary policy. We
applied approaches from text mining, specifically Wordfish and Wordshoal, which make it possible,
to empirically assess the question of the relative ideological position of the institutes given different
debate-specific effects.
By applying the Wordfish approach, we find that the average ideological position of all texts has
undergone a notable change after the financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. Based
on the identifying assumption that the DIW was ideologically ’to the left’ of the IfW in 1999 the
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estimated coefficients (the time-invariant θs) move in opposite directions for fiscal and monetary
policy. The finding of a shift in the wording of the business cycle reports is additionally supported
by applying more descriptive techniques. Certain words have been significantly overrepresented in
the texts after the crisis as compared to the time before the crisis.
Estimating the more sophisticated Wordshoal allows it to control for debate-specific effects.
The results show that the debate-specific effect, i.e. the combined effect of a latent ideological
position of each institution and the influence of a specific debate, has changed over time. In other
words, this approach reveals the conflicting wording of an institution as a response to the changing
debates in which the researchers have been engaged.
The latent ideological positions of the institutes identified by Wordshoal tally, on average, with
conventional wisdom: the DIW, for example, is found to be the ’left-winger’ both for monetary and
fiscal policy texts, while the IfW is the opponent. Still, it is noteworthy that the results for the
policy fields are similar, but not identical: Hence, labelling a certain entire institution as ’liberal’
or ’conservative’ implies a severe simplification.
Based on the debate-specific positions (which includes both, the latent ideological position and
the debate-specific polarization component), we document a notable time-variation of these posi-
tions given the different focus of debates. The debate-specific position of an institution changes over
time. Again, developments of the positions differ considerably between texts related to monetary
and fiscal policy. Furthermore, we find increased polarization in word-usage variation between the
documents stemming from institutes in case of monetary, but not for fiscal policy.
Considering the word loadings, we document for monetary policy positive, but small values
before 2008, which turn positive after this point in time. According to our identification scheme,
this corresponds to a more conservative/ monetarist position. At the end of the sample, however,
the values come down to pre-crisis ranges, suggesting a more neutral stance of the institutes. The
respective figures for fiscal policy show fluctuations around zero values before and after the financial
crisis until 2014/2015. Afterwards, there is a visible a shift of the baseline position towards a more
Keynesian/ activist position.
Further research may look deeper into this relationship by comparing the texts from research
and forecasting institutions directly with similar text (for example, the ‘Jahreswirtschaftsbericht’,
the regular government report on economic issues). Likewise, the interaction with texts from
monetary authorities may be of interest. From a more methodological perspective, structural topic




Bachmann, O. / Gründler, K. / Potrafke, N. / Seiberlich, R. (2019): “Partisan bias in inflation expectations”, Public
Choice , 1–24.
Beckert, J. (2013): “Imagined futures: Fictionality in economic action”, Theory and Society 42, 219–240.
Benoit, K. (2018): Scaling text, https://github.com/kbenoit/kbenoit.github.io/blob/master/assets/courses/
tcd2018qta/QTA_TCD_Day5.pdf. Date of download: 7/10/2020.
Benoit, K. / Watanabe, K. / Wang, H. / Nulty, P. / Obeng, A. / Müller, S. / Matsuo, A. (2018): “quanteda: An
R package for the quantitative analysis of textual data”, Journal of Open Source Software 3(30), 774, https:
//quanteda.io. Date od download: 7/30/2020.
Berger, H. / Woitek, U. (1997): “How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel
hypothesis”, European Journal of Political Economy 13(4), 807–821.
Beyer, K. M. / Pühringer, S. (2019): “Divided we stand? Professional consensus and political conflict in academic
economics”, ICAE Working Paper Series No. 94, Johannes Kepler University Linz.
Born, B. / Ehrmann, M. / Fratzscher, M. (2014): “Central bank communication on financial stability”, Economic
Journal 124(577), 701–734.
Bowles, S. / Carlin, W. (2020): “What students learn in economics 101: Time for a change”, Journal of Economic
Literature 58(1), 176–214.
Brunnermeier, M. K. / James, H. / Landau, J.-P. (2018): “The Euro and the battle of ideas”, Princeton University
Press.
Bunea, A. / Ibenskas, R. (2015): “Quantitative text analysis and the study of EU lobbying and interest groups”,
European Union Politics 16(3), 429–455.
Carroll, C. D. (2003): “Macroeconomic expectations of households and professional forecasters”, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 118, 269–298.
Cookson, J. A. / Engelberg, J. / Mullins, W. (2020): “Does partisanship shape investor beliefs? Evidence from the
COVID-19 pandemic”, Available at SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3621067,
date of download: 6/9/2020.
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